Figure 2.-Northwest Frontier of the British Indian Empire.

X Bo - Bolan Pass

X S - Shutergardan Pass

P - Peshawar


Q - Quetta

X Kh - Khyber Pass

J - Jacobabad

Pi - Pishin

S - Sibi


Aral Sea
Pamir
Amu
Darya
Badakshan
Wakhan
M
Kush
Hindu
B
K
J
G
Afghanistan
H
Persia
K
Sistan
Helmand
Indus
India
Arabian
Sea

THE COLD WAR IN AFGHANISTAN:

SOVIET ASCENDANCY IN AFGHAN AID
DURING THE
1973-1978 REGNANCY OF MOHAMMAD DAOUD
IN POST-WORLD WAR II SOVIET-AMERICAN COMPETITIVE CONTEXT

Occasional Paper #32

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His previous experiences include two years of residence in Iran, and Naval active duty as an operations officer during the Persian Gulf War.

This study is dedicated to Professor Edward Allworth and to Professor Ehsan Yarshater, both of Columbia University. Their priceless help made this study possible.

I. Introduction

During the 1980s U.S. naval warships came to transit the Strait of Hormuz on convoy duty for U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers, and after 29 April 1988 on convoy duty for all neutral shipping. The U.S. Navy conducted these evolutions under grave potential danger, far greater than that of a decade previous, within range of Soviet* combat aircraft poised at salient bases in Afghanistan. Some of these bases had been built by Soviet forces subsequent to their invasion of Afghanistan and some by American foreign aid during the 1950s.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was preceded by a growth of Soviet influence in that country, especially since 1954. Soviet influence on the economics of Afghan life (starting with foreign aid projects in 1954) and on the military (starting with military aid in 1956) gradually percolated, as it were, into influence on the politics of Afghanistan, as overtly manifested by support of the coup in 1978 which brought a communist government to power (albeit a communist government led by the Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (P.D.P.A.), rather than one led by the Moscow-favored Parcham faction).

Such growths of influence, brought about by huge Soviet investments and assistance, foreshadowed the invasion of 1979 which was launched to protect the new communist government in Kabul and to protect the Soviet stake in Afghanistan. Those who were surprised by the invasion may have been insensitive to the gradual integration of Afghanistan into the Soviet economy and into the Soviet geopolitical framework, which was evolving while American foreign aid and influence were diminishing.

The purpose of this writer's effort is to demonstrate that it may be efficacious to study contemporary foreign press, even the controlled press of a closed, or semi-closed, society with an undemocratic government. For example, a scholar employed by a research center or a government agency in the U.S. may perceive and measure changes in a foreign country's situation by means of studying that country's press. Such a scholar may become able to alert the U.S. Government that the profile of a rival power, such as an assertive regional power, is looming larg-

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* The term "Soviet" is historically appropriate for the temporal para-parameters of this monograph.

er than before in the landscape of national affairs in his country of study. He may become able to report that a favorable image of the rival power is being portrayed in the press to that country's society (or, at least, to the literate stratum of that society), with reasonable judgments as to what such an image may portend. His judgments may amplify intelligence on subtle or overt growths of the rival's political influence parallel to growths of other types of influence (economic, military, etc.).

None of the foregoing is to suggest that contemporary foreign press is the only source of information or signals about a foreign country. Information and signals may be perceived from many sources. The use of press is worthy of merit, but does not denigrate other sources (such as radio broadcasts documented by F.B.I.S., dispatches to U.S. newspapers, and diplomatic communiqués).

This writer focuses herein on Afghanistan as a case study. Though at the time of this writing (May 1992) forces from the former Soviet Union are no longer in Afghanistan, and the essentially pro-Moscow regime in Kabul (in the wake of President Najibullah's fall from power) collapsed under the aggregate power of factions of the Mujahedin, a continuing study of Afghanistan is relevant. The dynamism of regional and global events is such that use of Afghanistan's modern air bases by a regional power remains a possibility for contingency planning. (While speculative, a future Islamic government in Afghanistan may ally itself with Iran or Tajikistan (countries which are in a geographical and cultural continuum with Afghanistan), either of which may deploy its air forces to Afghanistan as part of a regional security pact.) Further, any case study demonstrates employment of concept and methodology. Accordingly, this case study may help this writer or another to conduct a similarly-conceived study on, say, Singapore's press with an eye on the future of the strategic Strait of Malacca.

II. BACKGROUND: AFGHANISTAN IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, spearheaded by battalions of the 4th and 105th airborne divisions on 17 December (during the tenure of President and Premier Hafizullah Amin), came as a

jolt to the West. For the first time since its withdrawal from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946, the Red Army was used against a neighbor outside of the East European COMECON/Warsaw Pact member states. The West was faced with a new Soviet salient position, closer to the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea, and began pondering Soviet intentions and capabilities from this new position.

Several different perspectives provided insights into Soviet intentions and capabilities from Afghanistan. Professor Dr. Rashid Khalidi, then at the Institute for Palestine Studies (recently at Columbia University's Middle East Institute and currently at Chicago University's Center for Middle East Studies), expressed the belief that the Soviet invasion was in the context of Soviet-American rivalries and provided the Soviet Union with a bargaining chip versus American deployment of missiles in Europe. [1] Also, in the immediate wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet Union became alarmed when the U.S. began to enhance its capabilities for power projection into the northern tier of the Middle East: "The Soviets seem to have perceived a sweeping U.S. advance throughout the entire region in the months preceding their decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan." [2] Selig Harrison of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote about the Soviet Union's abilities to stir Baluch nationalism within both Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan. [3] The U.S. Naval Institute counted Afghanistan as a Soviet client/surrogate from which power could be projected into the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, where the U.S. Navy has operated almost continually. [4] Dennis Ross, Executive Director of the Berkeley-Stanford Program on Soviet International Behavior, summarized an aspect of the Soviet role in Afghanistan in strategic context: "... if the Soviets could achieve some leverage over the flow of oil, they could manipulate European and Japanese dependency and erode the cohesion of the Western Alliance and also make U.S. allies more responsive to Soviet interests." [5]

While Soviet forces were active in Afghanistan, their salient positions helped to compensate for a weakness of Soviet Naval Aviation: the lack of aircraft carriers other than the <u>Kiev</u> class (which can only embark one kind of fixed-wing aircraft, the YAK-36 "Forger"* fighter). [6] The Soviet military availed itself of Afghanistan's strategic geography by building an airbase at Shīndand in the west of that country soon af-

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* N.A.T.O. designation

ter the invasion. In 1984 two other bases were built in the west and southwest of the country: at Mīr Dāud, 18 miles south of Herāt, and at Dasht-e Amīrān, 18 miles west of Zaranj and a mere 25 miles from the Iranian city of Zābol (according to Reuters as reported in the <u>Iran Times</u>). With Soviet aircraft already able to operate out of Shīndand in the West and out of Qandahār's airport (built with U.S. aid in the late 1950s) in the south, it is unlikely that the Soviet military needed more bases for use against resistance <u>Mujahedin</u> guerrillas. The <u>Iran Times</u> stated categorically: پایگاهای جدید شوروی خلیج فارس را در «تیررس» هواپیماهای شوروی قرار میدهد.[7]

> New Soviet bases place the Persian Gulf within range of Soviet aircraft. *

On the strategic value of Soviet air bases in Afghanistan, Amaury de Reincourt, a French historian, stated during the Soviet-Mujahedin war:

> ... many of the bases being built or expanded by the Russians in Afghanistan are meant just as much for aggressive strategic purposes of eventual operations in the Gulf and beyond as for fighting the rebellion within the country; Pakistani military authorities who have access to full information on this point are firmly of the opinion that this is the long-term purpose of the impressive Soviet military buildup.[8]

The strategic value of Soviet air bases in Afghanistan were addressed also by Selig Harrison.[9]

Fred Halliday, a member of the Transnational Institute, made a general observation that the world had begun to experience a new cold war in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, one which came to focus on the area of the Persian Gulf (rather than Europe and, later, Asia which were the foci of the first cold war). He cited a statement from Professor Dr. Robert Tucker of Johns Hopkins University as corroboration of this view: " 'Almost as certainly as did Europe in the 1940s, the Gulf provides <u>the</u>** critical source of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.' "[10]

The analysis of Jagat S. Mehta, former foreign secretary to the Government of India, revealed that the then Carter Administration inter-

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* Translation by Ralph Groves. ** Emphasis by Professor Tucker.

preted the Soviet invasion "... as a first step toward fulfilling Russian ambitions to secure warm water ports as well as to dominate the Persian Gulf and thereby control or even cut the West's oil life line." [11] (Mehta did not personally agree with this interpretation.) This interpretation of events gave rise to the Carter Doctrine:

> Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. 12

The circumstances brought about by the Soviet invasion (improved Soviet abilities for power projection toward the vital Strait of Hormuz, improved Soviet abilities to influence Baluch nationalism, and a new cold war between East and West) made the invasion a watershed event. The abovementioned Soviet abilities remained a viable option for several years even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, as long as a pro-Moscow client regime existed in Kabul. [13]

III. SOVIET-AMERICAN COMPETITIVE AID AND GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE

The influence of the Soviet Union grew gradually from the 1930s, during which time the Soviets received one-third of Afghan exports. Though the U.S. was dominant in trade, aid, and cultural relations with Afghanistan up to 1953, the Soviets came gradually to displace the U.S. as a partner with Afghanistan starting in 1954 (during the first period of Mohammad Daoud Khan as prime minister). In 1954 the Soviets extended $3.5 million to Afghanistan in credit for the building of silos and mills (with repayment to be via wool and cotton at only 3% interest per annum starting three years later). Later that year the Soviets provided technical aid for the building of a gasoline pipeline across the Amu Daryā, the building of four gasoline bulk storage tanks, dispersed throughout the country, and the paving of Kabul's streets. (The street paving, in particular, was a propaganda coup for the Soviets as the U.S. Import-Export Bank had refused to support such a project one year earlier.) [14]

U.S. support for Pakistan (a member state of Baghdad Pact/CENTO and SEATO over the Pushtunistan dispute with Afghanistan forced Prime Minister Daoud to turn to the Soviet Union in 1956 for military aid (a policy made urgent in the wake of the U.S. commitment in 1954 to

provide Pakistan with $21 million in military aid). This led to a $25 million deal for the Soviet Union to provide military equipment and training to Afghanistan. (By 1979, the Soviet military had trained 10,000 Afghan military personnel on Soviet territory.) [15]

Political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1955 resulted in Pakistan's closing of the border to Afghan transit trade destined for the port of Karachi. This prompted a Soviet-Afghan agreement on 28 June 1955 to permit transit trade, duty-free, across Soviet territory (based on Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship). On 27 August 1955 the Soviet Union guaranteed the sale of Afghanistan's fruit crop, imperiled by Pakistan's stoppage of transit trade. By November of 1955 Pakistan lifted the embargo, but, by that time, in the words of Anthony Arnold (a former U.S. intelligence officer who had served in Afghanistan) "... the way had been prepared for a quantum jump in Soviet-Afghan relations." [16] (These Soviet-Afghan relations were all the more solidified by U.S. refusal to help build a 1,000-mile-long highway from Afghanistan southward through Iran to provide an alternate route to the sea.)

In 1957 the Soviet Union discovered reserves of 500 million barrels of oil and 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas in Afghanistan and provided itself as a market for these resources. The following table relates the growth of Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union during the 1950s: [17]

	1950	1960
arms	0%	100%
petroleum products	10%	90%
total foreign trade	17% (1951)	50%

In 1968 aid from the Soviet Union amounted to $550 million (two-thirds in loans which could be repaid in commodities) compared to $250 million from the U.S. (80% in grants). [18] Soviet road-building in Afghanistan (which served Soviet strategic interests as much as Afghanistan's infrastructural needs) was completed by 1966, and for the first time Herāt and Qandahār were linked around the Hindu Kush. (This Soviet road building included the construction of three new bridges across the Besuda, Kameh, and Asmar rivers. (All of these bridges were overly

strong so as to hold the heaviest of Soviet tanks, according to the then U.S. military attaché who witnessed the construction.[19]) In 1978, the year of the coup against Daoud and the year before the Soviet invasion, aid from the Soviet Union was $400 million, making Afghanistan the fourth biggest recipient of Soviet aid and the greatest recipient in per capita terms.[20] "This triumph for Soviet diplomacy tends to be overlooked in the West when discussing the Russian invasion little more than a decade later."[21]

IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The coup of 26-28 April 1978 ("Saur 7 Revolution") was launched by cadres and sympathizers of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (P.D.P.A.)* in the Afghan army against President Mohammad Daoud Khan (of the Nāderī family) and resulted in the establishment of a "democratic republic" and the death of Daoud. This coup followed less than five years after Daoud's own coup of 17 July 1973 against the monarchy of Mohammad Zahir Shah. (The 1973 coup brought him to power for the second time. His first period of premiership had been from 1953 to 1963.) On 30 April 1978 Moscow recognized the new regime, the first foreign government to do so (raising suspicion that the Soviet Union had had foreknowledge of the coup, though not necessarily a hand in it). Anthony Arnold summarized that the coup was a culmination of Soviet ambitions toward Afghanistan: "... the long-term Soviet goal of establishing a pliable regime in Kabul had apparently been achieved."[22]

The new regime, headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, and Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, each a Deputy Prime Minister and Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (Amin was also Minister of Foreign Affairs), was supported by the Soviet Union. (In spite of his nominal position below that of Taraki, Amin commanded strong personal loyalty among key military officers and secret-police officials.) Taraki and Amin were of the Khalq

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*The Afghan Persian (Darī) nomenclature of P.D.P.A. is Hezb-e Demokrātīk-e Khalq-e Afghanestan, which in short may be referred to as Khalq, not to be confused with one of the factions of the P.D.P.A. which is also called Khalq. (The P.D.P.A. was first organized in 1965 as an underground communist group. It split into two factions, Khalq and Parcham, in June of 1967.)

faction of the P.D.P.A. whereas Karmal was of the Parcham faction. Public statements of mutual support between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union began almost immediately (even though the Soviet Union favored the Parcham faction over the predominant Khalq faction): Amin referred to the April coup as a " 'prolongation of the Great October Revolution of 1917.' Moscow soon echoed this view: 'Since the revolutionary victory of April 1978, the Afghan people under the leadership of the P.D.P.A. have taken the road to the building of socialism.' "[23] (Amin became premier in March of 1979, while Taraki held the positions of head of state and defense minister. In September of 1979 Amin assumed all of Taraki's titles.) The coup of 1978 and these kinds of laudatory public pronouncements indicated a growing Soviet influence and involvement in the Afghan political landscape and perhaps foreshadowed the invasion of 1979 which was launched in order to protect the new communist regime (as well as to acquire strategic advantages in the global context, as discussed above).[24]

There probably were overt manifestations before 1978, or, at least indications, that there was a growing Soviet involvement in Afghan politics parallel to growths in Soviet-Afghan economic ties (both occurring while U.S. involvement and ties were diminishing). The question begs us to seek evidence of such manifestations or indications, measure any changes over time, and then evaluate and interpret significant patterns.

V. ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS

Certain analytical questions can be raised: 1. to what degree were there discernable changes of public attitudes toward the Soviet Union between the two coups (1974 - 1977) and what qualitative matters did they entail?; 2. how did the attitudes express themselves in terms of frequency and content?; 3. what is the validity of using a controlled press in making an inquiry of this kind? ("The press has been fully state-owned since Daoud's coup in July 1973 when the few journals left in private hands during the monarchy were abolished."[25]); 4. what was the sort and extent of press coverage of Islam and of the <u>ulema</u> (clerical class), and what was the nature and substance of the interactions of this class with the government (especially as the government began to turn towards the left)?

In seeking answers to the above questions, this writer sought to uncover evidence to show whether or not the politico-military events of 1978 - 1979 might have been foreseen by outside observers had such observers been sufficiently sensitive to a changing situation in Afghanistan. This writer plotted the patterns in the Afghan press as a research center or government agency might have done by assigning the task of content analysis of the Afghan press to a scholar focusing upon the region to perceive and measure a changing situation. As suggested earlier, a scholar's reasonable interpretations based upon quantitative and qualitative changes of attitudes in the press might have shown that the Afghan authorities in Kabul consciously and intentionally made the Soviet Union's profile familiar and favorable to its literate stratum of society in the period between the two coups.

VI. METHODOLOGY (CONSISTING OF FOUR SUBTIERS)

a) Approach and Conceptual Frame of Reference

As discussed earlier, American influences upon Afghanistan wanned as those of the Soviet Union waxed. Accordingly, evidence of official attitudes towards the Soviet Union were sought by this writer in the open press. Articles about diplomatic relations and trade provide evidence of overt relationships between the two countries and articles regarding Soviet technological achievements provide insights into Afghans' perceptions of Soviet abilities. Additionally, evidence of official attitudes towards Islam were sought. Articles concerning Islam reveal official values of what religion's role in national life should be. The focus of this inquiry was upon the years 1974 and 1977.

Articles were found, and then categorized, according to their headlines. Also, one newspaper issue from each month (as a random sample) was scanned in its entirety in a search for content relevant to this inquiry under non-indicative headlines. This having been done, it was proved that headlines are generally indicative of content and therefore establishes that it is both valid and credible to find and categorize articles according to headlines.

For the purpose of this inquiry the conceptual frame of reference assumed a cultural continuum among Iran, Afghanistan, and other parts of

Central Asia.

b) Translation

In an interview with Professor Dr. Ehsan Yarshater, Director of Iranian Studies, Columbia University, this writer confirmed that the written version of Afghan Persian (Darī) is in conformance with Iranian Persian (Fārsī).[26] Accordingly, the use of Haĭm's Fārsī-English dictionary is appropriate for translating headlines and articles from the Afghan press into English.

c) Transliteration

The Chicago Manual of Style suggests the use of a system of transliteration "... employing as few diacritics as possible, except in linguistic or highly specialized studies."[27] As this is a specialized study, this writer will employ the academic system of transliteration used in common by the Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum, the Encyclopaedia Iranica, the Persian Heritage Series, the Persian Studies Series, and the Modern Persian Literature Series. A few terms and proper names which have been assimilated into English are presented in their anglicized forms.[28] Some terms are presented in other transliterations in the context of direct quotations, wherein the authors may have used other methods of transliteration.

d) Quantification

Articles which are pertinent to the focus of this paper were sifted into categories. The categories differ depending on the primary source because the intended audience and content differ with each primary source.

Articles about Soviet-Afghan economic, political, and diplomatic relations were the principal types of articles sought. Articles about Soviet relations with the U.S. were counted because they equate the Soviet Union with the U.S. as a great power of equivalent status. Articles about the Soviet Union in its relations with other countries were not counted because they are of a general news variety and do not necessarily amplify any aspect of Soviet-Afghan relations or present the Soviet Union as a co-equal power vis-à-vis the U.S.

Articles about internal Soviet development and about Soviet tech-

nology were quantified because they indicate, however obliquely, that the Soviet Union's system is laudable and worthy of imitation.

VII. SOURCES

This writer researched the microfilm collections in Columbia University's Lehman Library for the Kabul Times* of 1974 and 1977. Also, this writer researched the microfilm collections of Columbia's Butler Library for Anīs, the major Darī language newspaper, of the same years.[29]

The choice of the two newspapers cited above was made for the following reasons: Kabul Times was a major international newspaper printed in English and, as such, reflected an image which Afghanistan wanted to portray to the world; Anīs was a major Darī newspaper for the literate stratum of Afghan society. According to Mr. Ibrahim Pourhadi, Area Specialist of the Near East Section of the Library of Congress, Anīs was the major newspaper within Afghanistan during the 1970s. [30]

During the Soviet occupation a proliferation of ethnic newspapers occurred (in Baluchi, Tājīk, Pashtō, etc.), making the relative position of Anīs difficult to assess. The following assessments were made during the Soviet occupation concerning Afghanistan's linguistic landscape: According to the Economist, the Soviet Union is "... encouraging local culture and traditions in different parts of the country in the hope that Afghans will turn away from thoughts of national identity, which is the mainspring of their resistance to Soviet occupation." [31] According to Anthony Arnold, "the eventual goal is to reduce grassroots communication among the various tribes, with Russian in the end becoming the only common language." [32]

According to Mr. Obeidullah Noorata, an instructor of Central Asian languages at Columbia University, Darī has always held a pre-eminent place in Afghanistan's linguistic landscape (though the majority of people are Pushtun) because it is "... easy to learn and is a literary language easy for expression." [33] The late Louis Dupree, a leading scholar of Afghanistan, wrote that Darī "... serves as the lingua franca, although the Constitution designates Pashto as the 'national lan-

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* The superscription Kabul Times was changed to Kabul New Times in 1984.

guage.' "[34] Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, formerly a Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and subsequently on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, has corroborated Dupree's observation about Darī: despite political domination by Pashtuns (who produced monarchs and dominated the military), "... the language of the government and the lingua franca among the various communities was Dari. This dependence on Dari gave the Tajiks an advantage in the bureaucracy, where they were prominent."[35] According to the Encyclopaedia Iranica Darī is spoken by, or is at least comprehensible to, over 5.6 million people in an Afghan population of over 12 million (as of 1979), or approximately 46%. (The figure of 5.6 million includes 3.5 million Tajīks who speak Darī in addition to Tajīkī dialects and 1 million Hazāra who speak the Hazāragī dialect of Darī.)[36] It is for all of these reasons that the intellectuals and bureaucracy have always used Darī.

The historical context within which this writer analyzed the content of newspapers was obtained from secondary sources such as scholarly books and journals.

VIII. EVIDENCE

Overt manifestations of a growing interaction between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan can be quantified for the years 1974 and 1977. A survey of the issues of the Kabul Times for the first six months of each of those years indicates a marked evolution and contrast: the number of articles about the Soviet Union and about Soviet-Afghan relations increased from 24 to 56, more than doubling. (See addenda 1 and 2 for listings of headlines of articles.)

Due to the fact that this study is attempting to measure the profile of the Soviet Union in the Afghan press, it should be noted that 15 advertisements for Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, appeared in the Kabul Times in 1977. While not articles per se, these advertisements had specific Soviet-Afghan overtones in so far as they advertised a Kabul-Tashkent transportational connection. Also, they were large in size (one-quarter page), including a representation of an airliner, thus contributing to the profile of the Soviet Union in the Afghan press. No such advertisements appeared in the Kabul Times in 1974.

Taking these advertisements into account, this study's quantification of articles/advertisements about the Soviet Union and about Soviet-Afghan relations in 1977 should be increased from the 56 mentioned above by 15 to 71, which is about triple the 1974 figure.

The categories of articles/advertisements are as follows:

	a) Soviet Economic Assistance to and Trade with Afghanistan	b) Diplomatic Relations Between Soviet Union and Afghanistan (Including Meetings Between/Among Ministers and Delegations)
1974*	3	9
1977	16	8

	c) Soviet Internal Economic, Industrial, Political, and Cultural Developments/Achievements	d) Soviet Technology (Atomic, Space, Etc.)
1974	5	1
1977	8	9

	e) Politico-Economic Statements, Agreements, Messages of Bilateral Importance (Including Salutations, Joint Communiques, Observances of Treaty Anniversaries, Etc.)	f) Cultural Contacts Between Soviet Union and Afghanistan
1974	4	2
1977	6	6

(Further categories are found on the next page.)

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*Articles from the first six months of each year are quantified.

	g) Aeroflot Advertisements	h) Negative Coverage About Soviet Union
1974	 0	 0
1977	...............15 (all in Jan.)	 1

	i) Islam, Afghan Nationalism in the Context of Islamic Umma
1974	 0
1977	 2

Articles about internal Soviet developments and achievements and about Soviet technology (categories c) and d), respectively, above) are quantified because they indicate, however obliquely, that the Soviet system is laudable and worthy of imitation. Some articles in 1977 were written by Soviet authors, indicating a Soviet access to the Afghan press which was not overtly manifested, if it existed at all, in 1974. (See Addendum Number 2 for headlines of articles written by Soviet authors.)

The pertinent articles from Anīs are categorized identically, with the following exceptions: The category addressing Aeroflot advertisements is replaced by a category addressing favorable postures of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the U.S. and the West in the international arena. (This exception is necessitated by a lack of Aeroflot advertisements in Anīs and by the presence of many articles addressing Soviet international intercourse.) Also, Category i), about Islam, is expanded to include social aspects of Islam. The expansion of this category is necessitated by a great number of articles in Anīs (many more than in the Kabul Times), addressing Islam across a broad spectrum of human affairs. The extent of coverage on Islam and Islamic matters in Anīs indicates an editorial sensitivity to a Perso-Islamic primary audience.

Nearly parallel to the case of the Kabul Times, the number of articles in Anīs pertinent to this study increased substantially between the years 1974 and 1977: They increased in number from 29 to 77, more

than doubling. (As in the review of the Kabul Times, these figures reflect a quantification of articles published in Anīs during the first six months of each year, a sufficient representative sample to plot patterns.)

The categorization and quantification of Anīs articles are as follows:

	a) Soviet Economic Assistance to and Trade with Afghanistan	b) Diplomatic Relations Between Soviet Union and Afghanistan (Including Meetings Between/Among Ministers and Delegations)
1974	2	4
1977	11	8

	c) Soviet Internal Economic, Industrial, Political, and Cultural Developments/Achievements	d) Soviet Technology (Atomic, Space, Etc.)
1974	0	0
1977	3	2

	e) Politico-Economic Statements, Agreements, Messages of Bilateral Importance (Including Salutations, Joint Communiques, Observances of Treaty Anniversaries, Etc.)	f) Cultural Contacts Between Soviet Union and Afghanistan
1974	2	2
1977	2	3

	g) Soviet Union as a Power of Co-equal Status with the U.S./Reflecting Well Upon Soviet Union Vis-à-Vis the West	h) Negative Coverage About Soviet Union
1974	7	0
1977	28	3

i)
Islam, Social Aspects of Islam, and Afghan Nationalism in the Context of Islamic Umma

1974 12

1977 17

IX. SUMMARY

The evidence clearly shows that the frequency of articles in Kabul Times and Anīs about Soviet-Afghan affairs and about the posture of the Soviet Union in the world increased significantly between the two coups (1974 - 1977). The quantitative increase was not the only discovery supported by evidence: Articles about Soviet-Afghan affairs and about the posture of the Soviet Union in the world remained laudatory in quality while negative coverage remained minimal. As the quantitative increase in frequency was nearly parallel between the two newspapers and the content retained a laudatory quality, the positive image of the Soviet Union for both the English-speaking and the Perso-Islamic social strata of Afghan society was nearly equal. Undoubtedly, this positive image favorably disposed Afghan public attitudes toward a furtherance of Afghan economic integration into the Soviet Union and toward a benign political interrelationship between the two countries.

While the quantitative frequency and qualitative content in the two newspapers were nearly parallel on secular coverage pertinent to this inquiry, articles about Islam were concentrated most heavily in Anīs, rather than in Kabul Times. This is not surprising, given that Anīs' primary audience was Perso-Islamic, rather than Western-educated or international. (This also serves as a reminder that a scholar cannot acquire the entire flavor of a foreign press, or the complete cultural and religio-ideological context from which it comes, without being skilled in the language of the country in question.) In spite of Afghanistan's gradual political shift toward the Left in the 1970s, articles about Islam, social aspects of Islam, and Afghanistan's place in the context of the Islamic Umma increased in frequency by over 50%. The articles remained consistently favorable in content. It is clear that the Afghan press did not engender any anti-Islamic sentiments in public

attitudes while favorably posturing the Soviet Union.

What is the validity of using a controlled press in an inquiry of this kind? In so far as this inquiry sought to measure quantitative frequency and qualitative content in an area which would affect public policy, the use of a controlled press is quite valid. Such a press more closely reflects official attitudes than a press in another country which may reflect dissenting views, minority views, or irresponsible views by individuals who are unhinged from circles of power.

X. CONCLUSION

There were ample overt manifestations in the Afghan press of a growing favorable image of the Soviet Union before the 1978 coup. A scholar employed by a research center or a government agency may have been able to perceive and measure these manifestations. Such a scholar then may have been able to report to the U.S. Government that an ever favorable image of the Soviet Union was being portrayed in Afghanistan along with reasonable judgments as to what such a trend may have portended. His judgments may have amplified intelligence on subtle or overt growths of Soviet political influence parallel to growths of other types of influence (economic, military, etc.).

U.S. awareness of potential overt Soviet involvement in the landscape of Afghan politics may have enabled the U.S. to dissuade the Soviet Union from furtherance of such a policy (through diplomatic channels). U.S. pursuance of a role as a countervailing power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may have saved Afghanistan from its traumas of 1978, 1979, and beyond.

ADDENDA

Addendum 1 - Pertinent Headlines from Kabul Times, 1974*, in chronological order:

January - None

28 February - article on 53rd anniversary of 1921 Treaty

2 March - "President Daoud Sends Greetings to Soviet Leaders"

- "Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty Observed"

- "Soviet Mission Here for Talks on Economic Cooperation"

3 March - "President Meets Head of Soviet Delegation"

8 March - "USSR Leaders Reply to President Daoud's Message"

7 April - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society Delegation Here"

10 April - "Soviet Union Aids Afghanistan in Locust Campaign"

11 April - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society Delegation Leaves"

18 April - "Over 15 Billion Cubic Meters of Gas Exported to USSR"

21 April - "Siberia Holds Tremendous Natural Riches"

- "Gogol in Moscow"

23 April - "USSR Academy of Sciences and Cosmonautics"

27 April - "USSR, Japan Sign Accord on Gas Prospecting in Siberia"

- "Afghan Cultural Mission Visits Soviet Union"

- "Soviet Envoy Meets Education Minister Pazhwak"

8 May - "President Daoud Receives Soviet Economic Delegation"

- "Development of Industry in Soviet Union"

11 May - "Soviet Economic Delegation Leaves"

18 May - "Soviet Experts to Aid in Maintaining Technical Building"

22 May - "Soviet Composers Dig into USSR Musical Past"

26 May - "Education Minister Leaves for USSR"

- "Soviet Prime Minister Meets Afghan Envoy"

30 May - "USSR to Continue Assisting Afghan Women's Institute"

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* The collection of 1974 Kabul Times at Columbia University's Lehman Library lacked the 4 February and 4 October issues.

Addendum 2 - Pertinent Headlines from Kabul Times, 1977*, in chronological order:

3 January - Advertisement for Aeroflot Airlines (citing availability of transportational service from Kabul to Tashkent and thence to Moscow, which provides connections to many other places)

4 January - same as above

5 January - same as above

6 January - "USSR Harvests Record Grain Crop in 1976"
- same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

8 January - "Soviet TU-144 to Continue Test Flights This Year"
- same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

9 January - "Atomic Power Engineering in the USSR", by Igor Morokhov*
- same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

10 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

11 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above
- "USSR Subway Explosion Causes Casualties"

12 January - "Afghanistan Buys Telephone Equipment from USSR"
- same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

13 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

15 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

16 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above
- "Soviet Pianist Performs at Radio Hall"

17 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

18 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

19 January - "USSR Will Never Aggress: Brezhnev"
- same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above

23 January - "Afghanistan Buys 4,076,000 Rubles of Exploration Tools from USSR"

26 January - "Mohammad Naim of Foreign Ministry Met With Brezhnev in Moscow on 24 January"

31 January - "Soviet 1976 Grain Harvest: 224 Million Tons"

3 February - "Soviet Space Research Programme in 1976"

14 February - Article on Soyuz 24 (which appeared on the same day as: "Daoud Elected President of the Republic; Jirgah Vote Unanimous", which headline would draw attention to Soyuz)

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* The author is cited herein so as to highlight the significance of a Soviet author writing for Kabul Times.

Addendum 2 (continued):

17 February - Article on Salyut 5 orbital space station, by Mikail Chernyshov*

19 February - "Soviet Plans for Development of Siberia", by Viktor Varlamov*

22 February - Article on Soyuz 24

23 February - "Afghan-Soviet Trade Relations Expand"

24 February - "Cosmonauts Prepare for Return Journey to Earth"

26 February - "Soviet Cosmonauts Land Safely"

1 March - "Afghanistan Buys Spare Parts from Soviet Union"

9 March - Article on al-Afghani

22 March - "President Attends Jhenda Ceremony at Mazare Sharif"

24 March - "USSR Seeks No Base in Africa, says Podgorny"

26 March - "Afghan-USSR Trade Teams Hold Talks"

2 April - "USSR Gives Nine Million Rubles Loan to Afghanistan"

- "President of Afghanistan Scouts Association Went to USSR to Attend International Children's Festival in Moscow"

4 April - Front page: "Spare Parts from USSR" ($2.4 million for Fertilizer Plant)

6 April - Front page: "Five Hundred Tons of Olives to USSR"

-"USSR Launches Meteor Weather Satellite"

7 April - Front page: "Afghanistan to import 13,000 Tons of Sugar from USSR"

9 April - Soviet ambassador to Kabul went to Moscow to prepare for Daoud's visit in near future.

- Soviet trade delegation left for home.

12 April - "President Leaves on Official, Friendly Visit to Moscow to Moscow"

13 April - "President Daoud Warmly Welcomed by Soviet Leaders"

14 April - Front page: "President Hold Second Round of Talks with Soviet Leaders"

- Verbatim texts of President Daoud's speech and President Podgorny's speech were printed with above article.

16 April - "President Daoud Returns After Visit to Soviet Union"

- "Afghanistan-USSR Sign Economic Cooperation Accord"

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* The author is cited herein so as to highlight the significane of a Soviet author writing for Kabul Times.

<u>Addendum 2</u> (continued)

16 April (continued) - "Afghan-Soviet Joint Communique" (issued after Daoud's visit to the USSR, 12-15 April)

18 April - "Joint Afghan-Soviet Archaeological Expedition"

20 April - Agreement signed in Kabul to Buy Soviet Trucks for $\$\frac{1}{2}$ million

21 April - Text of Afghan-Soviet Economic Cooperation Agreement

- Lenin's Birthday Observed at Soviet Embassy

5 May - Soviet Delegation for frontier affairs arrives

11 May - Accord signed in Kabul for Afghan-Soviet cooperation against locust and agricultural diseases.

21 May - Soviet Delegation for frontier affairs leaves

26 May - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society Delegation Here"

-"Afghanistan, USSR Cooperation in Wiping Out Locust"

- "USSR to Promulgate New Constitution

30 May - "Soviet Industry Accelerates Rate of Development"

- Brezhnev article on peace, detente

4 June - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Delegation Leaves"

5 June - "Rights, Freedom of Soviet Citizens Under New USSR Constitution"

11 June - "Afghan Art Exhibit in Soviet Union"

15 June - Accord with USSR on copper smelting plant

- Olive-processing plant purchased from USSR

18 June - Brezhnev elected as President of USSR

Addendum 3 - Pertinent Headlines from Anīs, 1974, in chronological order:

اول دلو ۱۳۵۲ شمسی
نکسن بار دیگر از اتحاد شوروی باز دید
خواهد کرد

Nixon will make a return visit another time from the Soviet Union.

٤ دلو
نقش اتحاد شوروی در مرحلهٔ دوم
مذاکرات ژنیو

The role of the Soviet Union in the second stage of the Geneva negotiations.

17 دلو
اخوت و معاونت از نظر اسلام

Brotherhood and assistance with a view to Islam.

۲٤ دلو
اهمیت اقتصاد متوازن از نظار
اسلام

The importance of a symmetrical economy with a view to Islam.

۲۸ دلو
افغانستان در کنفراس سران
کشورهای اسلامی در لاهور
اشتراك میکند

→

Afghanistan participates in a conference with Heads of State of Islamic countries in Lahore.

٤ حوت
کنفرانس عالی کشورهای اسلامی
درلاهور افتتاح گردید

A high conference of Islamic countries has opened in Lahore.

٤ حوت
از نقطهٔ نظر افغانستان مساعی
کشورهای اسلامی باید به شکلی
صورت گیرد که مؤید مساعی
ملل متحد باشد

From the point of view of Afghanistan the efforts of Islamic countries must conform to efforts of the U.N.

٥ حوت
به مناسبت روز نظامی اتحاد شوروی
دعوتی ترتیب یافته بود

An invitation was arranged on the occasion of the military day of the Soviet Union.

7 حوت
کنفرانس سران کشورهای اسلامی
درلاهور خاتمه یافت

The conference of the heads of Islamic countries in Lahore came to a conclusion.

۷ حوت
مفکورهٔ عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام

The thought of social equity in Islam.

١٤ حوت
مقیاس عدالت اسلامی

The scale of Islamic justice.

١٨ حوت
زعمای اتحاد شوروی از پیام
رئیس دولت تشکر نموده‌اند

The leaders of the U.S.S.R. have expressed thanks for the message of the Head of Government.

١٠ حمل ١٣۵٣
بین اتحاد شوروی و امریکا در باره
تحدید اسلحه ستراتیژیکی اتومی
پیشرفتهای حاصل گردیده است

Between the Soviet Union and America progress has been achieved concerning the limitation of strategic atomic arms.

١٤ حمل
نمایندگان امریکا و شوروی در بارهٔ
تحدید اسلحه استراتیژیکی مذاکره
کردند

Representatives of America and the Soviet Union negotiated concerning limitation of strategic arms.

۱۵ حمل

روز جمعه مصادف با روز میلاد پیغمبر بزرگ اسلام است

Friday is coincident with the day of the birth of the great Prophet of Islam.

۲۷ حمل

نکسن: امریکا علاقه دارد تا مصر رفتار دوستانه تری در مقابل شوروی داشته باشد

Nixon: America has an interest that Egypt act amicably vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

۳۱ حمل

حفظ منافع عامه از نظر اسلام

The preservation of public interests with a view to Islam.

۱٤ جوزا

تحکیم بیشتر علایق افغانستان و اتحاد شوروی

The greater strengthening of attachments [between] Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

۱۵ جوزا

رئیس دولت و رهبر ملی ما با زعمای اتحاد شوروی در بارهٔ مسایل مورد علاقه مذاکره نمودند

The Head of Government and the leader of our nation discussed →

matters of interest with spokesmen of the Soviet Union.

۱۵ جوزا
گریچکو: شوروی باید آمادگی نظامی خود را حفظ کرده و قدرت دفاعی خود را ازدیاد بخشد

Grechko: The Soviet Union must protect its own military readiness and augment its own defensive power.

۱۵ جوزا
بناغلی محمد نعیم نمایشگاه عکاسی اتحاد شوروی را افتتاح نمودند

Benaqoli Mohammad Na'im inqugurated a photography exhibition of the Soviet Union.

۱۷ جوزا
نمایشگاه عکاسی اتحاد شوروی در کابل

A photography exhibition of the Soviet Union in Kabul.

۱۸ جوزا
رئیس دولت و صدر اعظم با زعمای اتحاد شوروی در فضای دوستانه صورت گرفت

The Head of Government and Chancellor in an atmosphere of friendship with a spokesman of the Soviet Union.

۱۸ جوزا
اعلامیه مشترک کنفرانس شخصیت های اجتماعی امریکا و شوروی →

Joint declaration of the personalities of the meeting of America and the Soviet Union.

۱۹ جوزا
اعلامیهٔ مشترك جمهوریت افغانستان
واتحاد جماهیر شوروی سوسیالیستی

Joint declaration of the Republic of Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R.

۲۰ جوزا
در تمویل ۲۱ پروژه اتحاد شوروی همکاری
اقتصادی وتخنیکی خود را ابراز داشته
است

The Soviet Union will divulge its own economic and technical cooperation in twenty-one projects.

۲۱ جوزا
۲،۸ ملیارد متر مکعب گاز به اتحاد
شوروی عقد گردید

2.8 billion cubic meters of gas was contracted to the Soviet Union.

۲۷ جوزا
هیأت افغانی در کنفرانس وزرای خارجهٔ
کشورهای اسلامی اشتراك میورزد →

The Afghan council in the conference held in common [with] foreign ministers of Islamic countries.

۲۹ جوزا

جهان اسلام و ممالك عربى

The Islamic World and Arab countries.

Addendum 4 - Pertinent Headlines from Anīs, 1977, in chronological order:

١٤ جدی ١٣٥٥ شمسی
مذاکرات سران شوروی و امریکا در
راه صلح و دیتانت موثر است

Discussions are taking place [between] heads of the Soviet Union and America on the road [to] peace and detente.

١٤ جدی
دافغان میوی سمون صنعتی شرکت
دو هزار تن کشمش به شوروی
صادر میکند

[An Afghan fruit industry] will export two thousand tons of rais ns to the Soviet Union. (Note: This fruit industry has a Pašto name, not a Darī one.)

١٧ جدی
نمایشگاه کتب اسلامی چاپ
ایتالیا افتتاح شد

An exhibition of published Islamic books has opened in Italy.

١٨ جدی
بناغلی محمد نعیم عازم اتحاد
شوروی شدند

Benaqoli Mohammad Na'im has set out [to] the Soviet Union.

١٩ جدی
امسال رهبر حزبی اتحاد شوروی و
رئیس جمهور امریکا باهم خواهند دید

The party leader of the Soviet Union and the President of America will see one another this year.

۲۷ جدی
بنظر سناتور امریکایی نباید در مورد عقد موافقه تحدید اسلحه اتومی بیحوصله بود —— حکومت امریکا پیشنهاد متقابله یی تحدید اسلحه استراتیژیکی را از شوروی دریافت نکرده است

In the opinion of an American senator, one should not be impatient in the case of a favorable agreement for the limitation of atomic arms --- The American government has not received a reciprocal proposal on limitation of strategic weapons from the Soviet Union.

۳ دلو
اتحاد شوروی خواهان اقدام عملی برای جلوگیری از مسابقه تسلیحاتی است

The Soviet Union desires measures for the prevention of armament competition.

۱۳ دلو
مصر خواستار واضح شدن سیاست امریکا و شوروی در مورد شرق میانه شد

Egypt has requested clarification of the policy of America and the Soviet Union concerning the Middle East.

۱۳ دلو
زلزلهٔ نسبتاً شدید هفت شهر آسیای میانه اتحاد شوروی را تکان داد

A relatively intense earthquake shook seven Central Asian cities of the Soviet Union.

۱٤ دلو
سیر قانون مدنی در اسلام

The development of civil law in Islam.

۱٤ دلو
زلزله حصص شمالی ترکمنستان شوروی را تکان داد

An earthquake shook parts of the north of Soviet Turkmenistan.

17 دلو
امسال بیش از ۴۱۰۰ تن میوه ستروس به اتحاد شوروی صادر گردید

This year more than 4,100 tons of citrus fruits will be exported to the Soviet Union.

۱۷ دلو
اتحاد شوروی خواستار معاهدهٔ جدید جلوگیری از مسابقات تسلیحاتی شد

The Soviet Union solicited a new treaty restraining armament competition.

۱۷ دلو

وانس در سفرش به شوروی برای درهم شکستن رکود کاهش قوا سعی مینماید

Vance is trying to make manifest a decrease in forces and to reduce mix-ups during his trip to the Soviet Union.

۱۸ دلو

وزیر پلان با سفیر شوروی راجع به تسریع کار پروژه‌های مربوط مذاکره کرد

The Minister of Bridges discussed acceleration of work pertaining to projects with the Soviet ambassador.

۱۸ دلو

اتحاد شوروی و امریکا موافقه دارند یک صلح عادلانه و دوامدار در شرقمیانه بوجود آید

The Soviet Union and America have an agreement to bring into existence a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

۲۰ دلو

اگر شوروی از تمرکز بعضی مرمیها دست بگیرد امریکا عمل مشابه را انجام میدهد

If the Soviet Union would embark upon centralization of some missiles, America would implement an analogous action.

۲۱ دلو
کیهان نوردان شوروی به داخل
سالیوت جا گرفتند

The Soviet Space Base in the interior has gotten control [of]
Salyut.

۲۱ دلو
کشتی های شوروی از آبهای ساحلی
کشورهای غربی استفاده کرده میتواند

Soviet ships can take advantage of coastal waters of Western
countries.

۵ حوت
روز نظامی شوروی تجلیل شد

Soviet Military Day was glorified.

۵ حوت
قرارداد خریداری هفت هزار تن
شکر از شوروی عقد شد

A procurement contract from the Soviet Union [for] 7,000 tons of
sugar was concluded.

۷ حوت
روز چهارشنبه مصادف به روز میلاد
مسعود پیغمبر اسلام است

Wednesday is coincident with the birthday of the blessed Prophet
of Islam.

۷ حوت
کیهان نوردان شوروی بزمین بر گشتند

Soviet cosmonauts returned to earth.

۹ حوت
در وزارت کشتی رانی تجارتی شوروی حریق رخ داد

A fire occurred in the Soviet Ministry of Commercial Shipping.

۱٤ حوت
میلاد مسعود حضرت پیامبر اسلام در سراسر کشور با مراسم خاص تجلیل گردید

The birthday of His Excellency the Blessed Prophet of Islam was glorified throughout the country with especial ceremonies.

17 حوت
رئیس مجلس اعلای شئون اسلامی جمهوریت عربی مصر وارد کابل شد

The Head of the exalted Islamic parliament of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) arrived in Kabul.

۱۸ حوت
دانشمندان فرانسه شوروی و الجزایر وارد کابل شدند

French, Soviet, and Algerian scholars have arrived in Kabul.

۲٤ حوت
تقاضای کارتر از شوروی در مورد تحدید اسلحه ستراتیژیکی

A Carter demand from the Soviet Union concerning limitation of strategic arms.

۳ حمل ۱۳۵۷
بناغلی رئیس جمهور بدعوت هیات رئیسهٔ شورای عالی اتحاد شوروی به آنکشور مسافرت می نمایند

Benaqoli, the Head of the Republic, per the invitation of the high executive committee of the Soviet Union is traveling to that country.

٤ حمل
بقول بریژنف روابط شوروی و امریکا در حال رکود است

According to Brezhnev the relations of the Soviet Union and America are at a standstill.

٤ حمل
شوروی نمیخواهد کدام پایگاه نظامی در افریقا داشته باشد

The Soviet Union does not want to have any military bases in Africa.

۷ حمل
شوروی وعدهٔ هرگونه کمک را برای افریقایی های تحت فشار استعمار داد

The Soviet Union and military detachments of every kind gave help for Africans to lower colonialization pressure.

۸ حمل

وزیر خارجه امریکا مذاکرات آتشین را با رهبران اتحاد شوروی آغاز کرد

America's foreign minister [secretary of state] started a fiery parley with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

۹ حمل

وانس نسبت به موفقیت مذاکرات خود با رهبران اتحاد شوروی خوشبین است

Vance is optimistic in relation to his successful parleys with leaders of the Soviet Union.

۱۳ حمل

شوروی بخاطر امنیت خود پیشنهاد- های امریکا را در مورد اسلحه اتومی نپذیرفت

The Soviet Union, for the sake of its security, did not accept America's proposals concerning atomic weapons.

۱۳ حمل

شوروی برای تاسیس یک شفا خانه دو صد بستر به افغانستان قرضه میدهد

The Soviet Union is giving a loan to Afghanistan for the establishment of a 200-bed hospital.

۱۳ حمل

شریعت اسلام و قانون اساسی — ۱

The religious law of Islam and constitutional law. (Part 1)

۱۸ حمل
شریعت اسلام و قانون اساسی — ۲

The religious law of Islam and constitutional law. (Part 2)

۲۰ حمل
شریعت اسلام و قانون اساسی — ۳

The religious law of Islam and constitutional law. (Part 3)

۲۰ حمل
سفیر کبیر شوروی عازم کشورش شد

A great ambassador of the Soviet Union is travelling out of his country.

۲۰ حمل
هیأت تجارتی شوروی عازم کشورش شد

A Soviet commercial mission set out from its country.

۲۲ حمل
کارتر شخصاً امر توقیف کشتی
اتحاد شوروی را داده است

Carter personally has given an order [for] the detention of a ship of the Soviet Union.

۲۳ حمل
بناغلی محمد داود بنابدعوت هیأت
رئیسه و حکومت شوروی عازم مسکو

گردیدند

Benaqoli Mohammad Daud set out [to] Moscow because of the invitation of the ruling council and government of the Soviet [Union].

۲۳ حمل

در حدود سه صد عضو از ۳۲ کشور
در جلسات بورد گورنرهای بانك
اسلامی اشتراك کرده اند

Approximately 300 members from 32 countries have participated in board-of-governor meetings with the Islamic Bank.

۲۳ حمل

امریکا مذاکرات خود را با شوروی
ادامه خواهد داد

America will continue its own parleys with the Soviet Union.

۲٤ حمل

بناغلی محمد داود دور اول مذاکرات
شان را با رهبران اتحاد شوروی آغاز کردند

Benaqoli Mohammad Daud began his first cycle of parleys with leaders of the Soviet Union.

۲٤ حمل

کارتر با سفیر شوروی در مورد تحدید
اسلحه اتومی مذاکره کرد

Carter discussed limitation of atomic arms with the Soviet ambassador.

۲٤ حمل

در حدود سه صد عضو از ۳۲ کشور
درجلسات بورد گورنرهای بانک
اسلامی اشتراک کردند — ۲

Approximately 300 members from 32 countries have participated in board-of-governor meetings with the Islamic Bank.

۲۵ حمل

مرحله دوم مذاکرات بناغلی محمد
داود بازعمای اتحاد شوروی آغاز
گردید

The second phase of discussions of Benaqoli Mohammad Daud began with spokesmen of the Soviet Union.

۲۷ حمل

بناغلی رئیس جمهور بعد از انجام
مسافرت از اتحاد شوروی به وطن
مراجعت کردند

Benaqoli, Head of the Republic, returned to the Fatherland after accomplishment of [his] trip.

۲۷ حمل

متن اعلامیهٔ مشترک افغانستان
و اتحاد جماهیر شوروی

The text of the joint statement of Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R.

۲۷ حمل
بناغلی رئیس جمهور از انسامبل
دولتی شوروی دیدن کردند

Benaqoli Head of the Republic paid a visit to the Soviet government from Ensambol.

۲۷ حمل
متن اعلامیهٔ مشترك افغانستان
و اتحاد جماهیر شوروی

The declaration of Afghanistan - U.S.S.R. partner [ship].

۲۷ حمل
موافقتنامه همکاری اقتصادی
بین افغانستان و شوروی عقد شد

An economic cooperative written agreement was contracted between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

۳۱ حمل
قرارداد خریداری ۲۸ عراده موتر از
شوروی امضا شد

A procurement contract was signed for 28 motor carriages from the Soviet Union.

اول ثور
وانس با سفیر شوروی راجع به
تحدید اسلحه اتومی مذاکره کرد

Vance discussed limitation of atomic weapons with the Soviet ambassador.

اول ثور
متن موافقتنامه همکاری اقتصادی بین افغانستان و اتحاد شوروی

The text of the written agreement of economic cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

۲۰ ثور
موافقتنامۀ تحقیقی پروژه های ارزاقی بین افغانستان و اتحاد شوروی عقد شد

An investigatory written agreement of foodstuff projects was contracted between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

۲۱ ثور
تمرکز ثروت از دیدگاه اسلام

Concentration of wealth from the point of view of Islam.

۲۲ ثور
مذاکرات شوروی و امریکا از سرگرفته شد

Soviet and America[n] discussions have been realized.

۲۶ ثور
کنفرانس وزرای خارجه کشورهای اسلامی در لیبیا افتتاح میشود

A Foreign Ministers' conference of Islamic countries has been inaugurated in Libya.

۲۷ ثور
کنفرانس وزرای خارجه کشورهای اسلامی توسط قذافی افتتاح شد

A Foreign Ministers' conference of Islamic countries was inaugurated [by] the intermediation of Qaddafi.

۲۸ ثور
افغانستان در راه حفظ میراث بزرگ اسلام مجاهدت نموده و مینماید

Afghanistan has shown and indicated an endeavor in the direction of protecting the great inheritance of Islam.

۳۱ ثور
هیات شوروی عازم کشورش شد

A Soviet council set out from its country.

اول جوزا
وجود اختلافات بین اتحاد شوروی و امریکا دربارهٔ امضای موافقتنامه سالت

The existance of conflict between the Soviet Union and America regarding the signature of the SALT written agreement.

۲ جوزا
کارتر: هدف عمده حکومت امریکا بهبود روابط آنکشور با شوروی وج،م چین است

Carter: The main objective of the government of America is the well-being of relations of that country with the Soviet Union and China.

۳ جوزا

ما در افغانستان برای ایجاد شرایط
پیشرفت از اساسات مقدس اسلام
پیروی میکنیم

We in Afghanistan go by the holy foundations of Islam for the creation of conditions of progress.

۵ جوزا

مسودهٔ قانون اساسی جدید اتحاد
شوروی تصویب شد

The draft of the new fundamental law of the Soviet Union was ratified.

۵ جوزا

عقد قرارداد کمک‌های مجادله علیه
ملخ بین افغانستان و اتحاد شوروی

Conclusion of a contract of assistance between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union countering locust.

۵ جوزا

هیات انجمن دوستی اتحاد شوروی
و افغانستان وارد کابل شد

The Council of the Society of Friendship of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan arrived in Kabul.

۸ جوزا

باز دید هیات انجنیران وزارت پلان
از امور ساختمانی عمارت گمرک
اسلام قلعه

Again, the Council of the Engineers' Ministry of Bridges levies a customs duty of Islam on constructional matters.

۹ جوزا

شوروی آماده مذاکره در باره محدود ساختن تسلیحات میباشد

The Soviet Union will be prepared to parley concerning limitation of the building of armaments.

۹ جوزا

قانون اساسی جدید در اتحاد شوروی

A new fundamental law in the Soviet Union.

۱۱ جوزا

هیات انجمن دوستی شوروی و افغانستان با معین وزارت زراعت ملاقات کرد

The council of the Friendship Society of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan met with the established Cultivation Ministry.

۱۲ جوزا

نظم آیندهٔ اقتصادی جهان اسلام

The future economic order of the world of Islam.

۱٤ جوزا

هیات انجمن دوستی شوروی و افغانستان عازم کشورش شد

The Council of the Friendship Society of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan has set out from its country.

۱۷ جوزا
فهمی از شوروی بازدید خواهد کرد

Fahmi will return from the Soviet Union.

ENDNOTES

1. In an interview of Professor Dr. Khalidi by Ralph Groves at Columbia University, New York City, 2 December 1988, 2:45 PM, Khalidi opined that the planned withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the wake of the recent I.N.F. Treaty, combined with a general relaxation of global tensions between the superpowers, may vindicate his belief. (Note: discussed in the context of geopolitics.)

2. Rashid Khalidi, The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s (Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1980), p. 18

3. See Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, N.Y., Wash., D.C., 1981, 228 pp., xi). See also articles by the same author which suggest that potential Soviet support for Baluch nationalists could have achieved for the USSR warm-water ports at Gwadar and other sites: "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?", Foreign Policy, Number 41, Winter 1980-81, pp. 163-187, and "Cut a Regional Deal", Foreign Policy, Number 62, Spring 1986, pp. 126-147, and "Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry", International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1980/81, pp. 152-163. See also Amaury de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/1983, pp. 416-437.

4. See The Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, Jan. 1986, p. 7. Note: As of 1992 this strategy is no longer used.

5. Dennis Ross, "The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, Number 4, Winter 1984-1985, p. 623

6. Most Soviet Naval Aviation was shore-based and had to be deployed to shore stations within proximity of the Soviet fleet. Karen Dawisha, Lecturer in the Department of Politics of the University of Southampton, pointed out the value which Egyptian airbases had afforded to the Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, when the Soviet Union was on good terms with Egypt. (See Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1979, 271 pp., xiii). Likewise, Afghanistan's relatively close proximity to the waters on both sides of the Strait of Hormuz facilitates power projection into that area (a matter of great import since many oil tankers and U.S. naval vessels transit the area).

7. Iran Times, Vol. XIV, No. 36, Friday, November 23, 1984

8. Amaury de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/3, p. 432

9. See Selig S. Harrison, "Cut a Regional Deal", Foreign Policy, No. 62, Spring 1986, pp. 126-147 (especially p. 139 where Harrison mentions that certain runways can accommodate large Soviet "Bison"

ENDNOTES
(Continued)

aircraft). Further to a discussion of specific Soviet aircraft, the ability of Soviet long-range aircraft (for anti-shipping strike, anti-submarine/maritime patrol, electronic warfare, reconnaissance) to reach the Strait of Hormuz from bases in the southern Soviet Union had been long established. Aircraft of these types which the Soviet Union could have deployed included IL-38 "May," M-4 "Bison," TU-16 Badger," TU-22 "Blinder," TU-26 "Backfire," and TU-142 "Bear" (all of which configurations had variants in service with Soviet Naval Aviation). Salient bases in Afghanistan decreased the transit time of these aircraft during potential combat missions toward the Strait of Hormuz, and increased, thereby, loiter time over target areas (without the logistical complication of resorting to in-flight refueling). Also, more importantly, such bases afforded fighter protection to the aforementioned aircraft for potential combat missions toward the Strait of Hormuz. The positioning of high-performance fighter aircraft at such bases put them within range of the strait. Types of fighters which the Soviets could have deployed included MiG-23 "Flogger," MiG-29 "Fulcrum," MiG-31 "Foxhound," and SU-27 "Flanker." (It should be noted that the MiG-29 was designed to operate from rudimentary runways, as evidenced by louvres which protect the air intakes from foreign object injestion.) See Bill Gunston, Aircraft of the Soviet Union: The Encyclopaedia of Soviet Aircraft Since 1917 (Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1983, London, 414 pp.), and Air Force Magazine (Air Force Association, Arlington, VA., March 1987 issue), and "Soviet Aviation in Afghanistan," Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, February 1987 issue), pp. 85-88. (Note: For the future, aircraft from Islamic Republics neighboring Afghanistan may be more pertinent with regard to deployment to Afghan bases than Russian aircraft from the former Soviet Union.)

10. Fred Halliday, Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1981, 143 pp.), p. 9

11. Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," Foreign Policy, No. 47, Summer 1982, p. 139

12. Fred Halliday, Op. Cit., p. 21

13. For a discussion of how a client Kabul could have granted military basing rights to Moscow (possibly modeled on the Porkkala, Finland, naval base precedent) see Selig S. Harrison, "A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?", Foreign Policy, No. 51, Summer 1983, pp. 13 and 24.

14. For a detailed discussion of foreign aid to Afghanistan, see Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA., 1985, 179 pp., xviii). See especially pp. 33 - 39.

15. See Ibid., pp. 33 - 39.

16. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, cited above, p. 36.

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(Continued)

17. Ibid., data derived from narrative on p. 39.

18. Ibid., see chapter 5.

19. Ibid., see chapter 4.

20. Ibid., see chapter 6.

21. John C. Griffiths, Afghanistan: Key to a Continent (Westview Press, CO., 1981, 225 pp.), p. 152

22. Anthony Arnold, Op. Cit., p. 71

23. Middle East Research & Information Project (MERIP), July-August 1980, p. 4

24. See Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?", Foreign Policy, No. 41, Winter 1980-81, pp. 163-187, for an account of domestic, regional, and global dimensions of the coup and the invasion. Of particular interst is Harrison's research on the role of the Shah of Iran, who attempted to orient Afghanistan militarily and economically away from Moscow and toward the West (alarming the P.D.P.A. and the Soviet Union in the process).

25. Arabia: The Islamic World Review, May 1984, p. 69

26. Interview of Professor Dr. Ehsan Yarshater by Ralph Groves, 19 March 1988, 10:30 AM, Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, New York City. Note: discussion in context of Persian literature.

27. The Chicago Manual of Style (Thirteenth Edition, Revised and Expanded, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1982, 738 pp., ix), p. 268

28. See Encyclopaedia Iranica (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vol. 1, Fascicle 1, 1982), pp. 4 and 5.

29. According to Haĭm, The One-Volume Persian-English Dictionary (Librairie-Imprimerie Beroukhim, Teheran, 1961, 1040 pp.), the term anīs means "companion", or "associate", and can be used as a feminine proper name. Vartan Gregorian, author of The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA., 1969, 586 pp.), prefers the translation of "companion". See his book, p. 244.

30. Interview of Mr. Ibrahim Pourhadi by Ralph Groves, 16 April 1986, 10:00 AM, Library of Congress, Near East Section, Washington, D.C.

31. The Economist, March 13, 1982, p. 58

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(Continued)

32. Anthony Arnold, Op. Cit., p. 109

33. Interview of Mr. Obeidullah Noorata by Ralph Groves, 23 April 1986, 2:20 PM, Columbia University, New York City

34. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton University Press, 1973, 760 pp., xxiv), p. 66

35. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Southwest Asia: Political Development or Political Decay?", Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1984-85, p. 660

36. Encyclopaedia Iranica (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vol. 1, Fascicle 5, 1983): all statistics gleaned from article on Afghanistan, section on ethnography, pp. 496-499, columns A and B.

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